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Abstract
We examine price transmissions among farm, wholesale and retail U.S. beef markets using two
types of retail price data, one collected by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), and the other one
collected at the point of sale using electronic scanners. Using a test based on the simulation of
nonlinear impulse response functions, we nd no evidence of vertical asymmetric price transmissions
in models estimated using scanner data. However, prices adjust asymmetrically in models estimated
using BLS data. Because scanner prices are more reective of actual consumer purchases, the U.S.
beef market is not as inecient as previous studies suggest.
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1 Introduction
Farm, wholesale and retail meat price relationships have been ardently debated for a long
time in the U.S. Since the 1970s, numerous congressional hearings and commissions have
addressed price transmissions among vertically linked meat markets (Koontz and Ward,
2011).1 The focus of this debate has been on economic and agricultural policy issues related
to market concentration, welfare distribution, and market efficiency. An often noted concern
raised by both producers and consumers is the growing gap between farm and retail meat
prices. Claims persist that producers do not benefit from downstream price increases, in
the same magnitude or speed, as downstream price decreases. For instance, a decrease in
retail beef price due to a decrease in beef demand passes to farm prices faster than a retail
price increase (U.S. Department of Justice, 2012).2 From a consumer perspective, there are
concerns that retail and wholesale meat prices are rigid or slow to respond to farm price
declines, but responsive to farm price increases. Consequently, cost increases are transferred
on to consumers more rapidly than costs savings (Abdulai, 2002).
Economic theory provides several mechanisms by which there could be asymmetric
1The interest of policymakers can at least partially be explained by the size of the U.S. beef industry,
which had a retail equivalent value of $105 billion as of 2015 (U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA),
Economic Research Service, 2016).
2Beef cattle producers attribute the increase in farm-to-retail price spreads, and consequently the decline
in the farmer’s share of the dollar consumers spend on food, as evidence of a lack of competitiveness among
middlemen along the beef supply chain. This claim is based on the high levels of market concentration among
meat packing firms and large retailers, which enables them to potentially exercise market power (Crespi,
Saitone and Sexton, 2012). As documented by the USDA, the national four-firm concentration ratio for
steer and heifer slaughter increased from 25% in 1976 to 85% in 2015 (USDA Grain Inspection, Packers and
Stockyards Administration, 2016).
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price responses in vertically linked markets including market power and concentration at
processing and retail levels (e.g., Azzam, 1999; Bailey and Brorsen, 1989; Peltzman, 2000;
Xia, 2009); menu costs (e.g., Bailey and Brorsen, 1989; Levy, 1997); inventory adjustment
practices (e.g., Blinder, 1982); government intervention (e.g., Kinnucan and Forker, 1987;
Mohanty, Peterson and Kruse, 1995); consumption inertia (Xia and Li, 2010); and empirical
methodology employed in testing for asymmetry (Miller and Hayenga, 2001). However, a
necessary condition for accurately assessing price asymmetry in these markets is that the
data used for analyses are adequate (Bailey and Brorsen, 1989; von Cramon-Taubadel, 1998).
For retail meat prices especially, concerns exist regarding the accuracy of traditional data
series (Lensing and Purcell, 2006).
Retail prices collected by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) are used widely in
a large body of published research. However, evidence suggests that these data are biased
and do not fully capture retail price variability over time (Hausman, 2003). That is, BLS
price data do not accurately reflect volume-weighted sales of beef products. Instead, BLS
price data simply reflect posted shelf prices on beef products with limited adjustment for
actual volume of beef that is sold at each price level, particularly at discounted prices during
retail specials (Lensing and Purcell, 2006). Thus causing a significant upward bias on price
estimates. This issue raises the question of whether findings from previous studies that have
used BLS retail price data are reliable.
The Livestock Mandatory Reporting Act of 1999 mandated collection of farm and
wholesale meat prices to facilitate open, transparent price discovery and provide market
participants with comparable levels of market information for cattle, swine, sheep, beef,
and lamb meat. The Act also required the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) to
investigate the use of an alternative source of retail meat prices that would provide retail
price data more reflective of actual consumer purchases than BLS data. The purpose of this
provision was to address concerns regarding the quality of BLS retail meat price data (Hahn,
Perry and Southard, 2009). As an alternative to BLS retail meat price data, scanner based
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quantity-weighted retail price data was considered. Scanner data are collected at the point
of sale by supermarkets using electronic scanners in check-out lines. Unlike BLS price data,
scanner data enables accounting for volume of sales and discounted prices in summarizing
prices each period.
In addition to the concerns regarding the quality of data used in studies assessing
asymmetric price transmissions, other substantial issues are the empirical methodology
employed to test for asymmetry and the frequency of the data employed. Meyer and von
Cramon-Taubadel (2004) indicate that different methods lead to different rates of rejection of
the null hypothesis of symmetry and conclude that asymmetry findings in existing literature
have been method-driven. Furthermore, von Cramon-Taubadel (1998) argues that data
frequency influences asymmetry test results. In particular, if price transmission between
two markets is asymmetric in the short-run but symmetric in the long-run, estimation with
low frequency data will reflect the latter and fail to expose the former. Therefore, another
important question is whether asymmetric price transmission findings are sensitive to both
testing methods and data frequency employed.
The objective of this study is to determine the sensitivity of price asymmetry results
to specific retail price series, testing methods employed, and data frequency. More specifically,
we compare price transmissions using two distinct types of retail beef prices that differ
according to their collection procedure: BLS retail price data and scanner quantity-weighted
retail price data. To test for and quantify asymmetric responses we adopt a new method
that is based on the simulation of nonlinear impulse response functions. This method is then
contrasted with more traditional approaches such as those used by Goodwin and Holt (1999).3
To test whether price asymmetry results differ when using data of different frequencies we
estimate our models using both monthly and weekly data.
The methods used in this study involve the estimation of nonlinear structural vector
3Consistent with other work, Goodwin and Holt (1999) found statistically significant thresholds and
asymmetries in price adjustments in the U.S. beef market chain.
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autoregressive (SVAR) models that allow for asymmetric responses of retail, wholesale, and
farm prices to shocks to any of these series. Impulse response functions are then computed
by simulation following the extension of Koop, Pesaran and Potter (1996) proposed by Kilian
and Vigfusson (2011). We use this information to calculate the degree of asymmetry following
shocks to each of the price series.4 Finally, we conduct a counterfactual analysis to check
whether our results are due to an uninformative dataset that causes the test for asymmetric
responses to have low power.
In this study, we find evidence indicating that price asymmetry results are sensitive
to the choice of retail beef price series. We do not reject the null hypothesis of symmetric
responses to shocks at any point in the distribution chain when models are estimated using
scanner retail price data. On the other hand, when the scanner data is replaced with the
widely-used BLS retail price series, we do find evidence of asymmetric price responses in
some cases. What can account for the difference in results when changing the retail beef price
series? The USDA began collecting scanner data in response to concerns about the quality
of BLS retail meat price data (Hahn, Perry and Southard, 2009). The quantity-weighted
retail scanner price data should better reflect the price that consumers actually pay for beef,
and our results do support that notion, as we find that scanner retail prices are much more
responsive than BLS prices to upstream price changes. We also find that asymmetry results
are robust to the use of different methods and data frequency.
Our results have important implications for the U.S. beef market. First, since price
is the primary link between vertically integrated markets, the analysis of price transmissions is
fundamental to understand how markets operate (e.g., marketing margins, spreads and pricing
practices). Second, this analysis has implications for policy makers because the presence
of asymmetry implies a different distribution of welfare than under symmetry. Therefore,
4There has been a recent debate in the macroeconomics literature on asymmetries in the response of
output to oil shocks (see e.g. Hamilton (2003, 2011), Herrera, Lagalo and Wada (2011), Kilian and Vigfusson
(2011a, 2011b, 2013, 2017), and Ravazzolo and Rothman (2013)). One outcome of this debate has been the
development of econometric tools that can be used to estimate models with asymmetries.
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depending on the degree of asymmetry, certain policies may not be as beneficial to producers
as expected, which in turn could also carry adverse effects for consumers (Awokuse and Wang,
2009). Lastly, the impact of government intervention targeting potential inefficiencies in the
U.S. beef market could have unexpected welfare and income distribution effects depending
on the presence or absence of asymmetry.
2 Related Literature
This is not the first paper to test for asymmetric adjustment in the U.S. beef market.5 The
closest to the present, Goodwin and Holt (1999, hereafter GH), investigated price transmission
asymmetries using weekly data. They concluded that there was asymmetric price transmission,
with unidirectional causal flow from farm to wholesale to retail markets, but the magnitude
of asymmetry following a particular shock was not economically significant.
The primary difference between the present study and GH is the methodology. The
generalized impulse response function analysis in GH can be used to make forecasts, identify
deviations from linearity in a system of equations, and characterize persistence in the data,
but it was not designed to do impulse response function analysis, at least not in the sense
that the term is commonly used in the structural VAR literature.6 We apply the methodology
in Kilian and Vigfussion (2011), which builds on the generalized impulse response function
analysis in Koop, Pesaran and Potter (1996), to estimate the responses of retail, wholesale,
and farm beef prices to shocks to upstream and downstream beef prices. The impulse response
functions we report are not conditioned on an assumption of a particular choice for recent
price behavior or a particular set of future shocks.7 See Kilian and Vigfusson (2011) for
5Related studies that we do not discuss here include von Cramon-Taubadel (1998), and Peltzman (2000).
6As Kilian and Vigfusson (2011) explain, “Such responses may be useful in characterizing the persistence
of the data, but they are devoid of any economic interpretation.”
7As Kilian and Vigfusson explain, “Thus, nonlinear impulse response functions must be computed for a
given shock as the average of impulse response functions obtained using alternative initial conditions. This
point is well known (see, e.g., Gallant et al., 1993; Koop et al., 1996) . . . ”
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further discussion of this point.
Our methodology also differs from GH along two other dimensions. First, we
present confidence intervals on the estimated impulse response functions. Second, we allow
for asymmetry in the response to deviations from the long-run relationship between the
variables, using a threshold cointegration model as in GH, but also in the short run response
to price changes, as in the literatures on gasoline pricing (see e.g., Borenstein, Cameron and
Gilber, 1997), the effects of oil shocks on the macroeconomy (see e.g., Hamilton, 2011; Kilian,
2008; Kilian and Vigfusson, 2011), and other markets (Peltzman, 2000). The threshold
cointegration model is intuitively appealing - a price series might return to equilibrium at
a different speed depending on the sign and magnitude of its deviation from its long run
equilibrium value. It is nonetheless difficult to justify the assumption that this is the only
type of asymmetry in the system. Among other things, the requirement that asymmetries
have to take a threshold cointegration form rules out asymmetries when the price series are
stationary, or when they are nonstationary but not cointegrated. The theoretical justification
for such a restrictive assumption is unclear.
A final difference between this paper and GH is that our dataset is taken entirely
from the post-Livestock Mandatory Reporting Act regime. GH was published in 1999, and
as a result, they used much older data in their analysis. In addition to the differences in
methodology described above, a reassessment of their results using recent data is warranted.
Frey and Manera (2007) and Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel (2004) provide
comprehensive surveys of the empirical literature on agricultural commodity price asymmetry,
classifying and comparing heterogeneous studies in terms of econometric models employed,
type of asymmetries tested and findings. More recent studies dealing with asymmetric
price transmission in the U.S. beef supply chain are Boetel and Liu (2010), Emmanouilides
and Fousekis (2015), Fousekis, Katrakilidis and Trachanas (2016), and Chung, Rushin and
Sarathkal (2017).
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Boetel and Liu (2010) examined wholesale and retail price relationships in the beef
and pork markets by accounting for possible structural breaks in the data. Their results
revealed the presence of asymmetric price responses in the beef market distribution chain.
However, they worked with a reduced-form model, restricted the analysis to a threshold
cointegration model, and conditioned on a specific history and set of future shocks when
computing impulse response functions. Therefore, their findings are subject to the criticisms
of Kilian and Vigfusson (2011). Emmanouilides and Fousekis (2015) used a statistical copula
approach to assess the degree of price dependency along farm and wholesale, and wholesale
and retail beef prices using data from 2000 to 2013. Their results provide evidence of positive
asymmetric price transmissions, mainly between farm and wholesale prices, but they do not
provide information about the magnitude of asymmetry, nor the speed of adjustment in the
price transmission process, and their study was limited to performing hypothesis tests.
Fousekis, Katrakilidis and Trachanas (2016) applied a nonlinear autoregressive
distributed lag model to monthly U.S. beef price data and found evidence of price asymmetry
from farm to wholesale and from wholesale to retail markets. Chung, Rushin and Sarathkal
(2017) contrasted price transmissions before and after the implementation of the Livestock
Mandatory Reporting Act and found limited evidence of increasing asymmetric price responses
in the post-Act period. The four aforementioned studies have advanced the vertical price
transmission literature by applying more complex methods. However, these studies have also
relied on BLS retail price data to conduct their analysis.
In the literature, concerns exist regarding the quality of traditional data series used
in economic analysis. More specifically, the use of BLS retail price series has long been
criticized. In 1978, Geithman and Marion published a critique of the use of BLS data for
market structure-price analysis. They argued that bias in the BLS price data confounded true
market structure-price relationships and adjustments in sampling and reporting procedures
are needed to make the data more useful. Despite frequent revisions in price data collection
and measurement methodologies, the BLS has not developed a methodology to correct for
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potential bias in reported food prices. More recent work by Hausman and Leibtag (2009)
showed that the consumer price index (CPI) for food- at-home, calculated using price data
collected by BLS, overstates food price inflation. During 1998 to 2001 about a 15 percent
upward bias was present in the CPI for food-at-home, which Hausman and Leibtag attributed
to the increasing share of food purchases made at alternative (non-traditional) retail stores
such as supercenters, mass merchandisers and club stores.
Few studies have compared advantages and shortcomings of using scanner price data
versus BLS retail price data. Hahn, Perry and Southard (2009), used dynamic-adjustment,
state-space models to assess the relative value of the two data series in representing the
national average retail price and forecasting near-term meat market conditions. Using monthly
data from January 2001 to August 2005 (56 observations), they also analyzed wholesale-retail
price relationships (including speed of adjustment) in beef, pork, broiler, whole chickens and
whole frozen turkeys. Scanner data contributed little to the price analysis for four of the
five meat products, particularly attributed to timing issues – scanner data was available
with a 7-8 week lag, whereas BLS data were generally available 12-20 days after the end of
the month of interest. Lensing and Purcell (2006) analyzed differences between the means
and variances of BLS and scanner quantity-weighted monthly average prices for beef and
estimated elasticities using a single equation quantity-dependent demand function. Scanner
quantity-weighted monthly average retail prices for five of six beef items were lower than
BLS prices. Scanner quantity-weighted prices also had a higher variance for five of six retail
items. In addition, BLS prices were greater than scanner prices and resulted in more elastic
own-price elasticity estimates.
Previous studies have also examined asymmetric price transmissions in different
markets using BLS retail price data. For example, Gervais (2011) tested for nonlinearities
in the long- and short-run price relationship in the hog/pork supply chain by applying a
smooth transition cointegration model. Results provided evidence of nonlinearities in the
farm-to-retail price relationship. Focusing on dairy markets, Awokuse and Wang (2009) found
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that prices at the producer-retail levels portray an asymmetric behavior of in butter and fluid
milk markets, but not in the cheese market using threshold error correction models. More
recently, Kim and Ward (2013) examined vertical price transmissions within 100 commodities
in the food sector and found evidence of asymmetric behavior in all but three of the five food
groups considered in the analysis (i.e., grains, red meats, poultry and eggs, and dairy, but not
fruits and vegetables). The limitations of BLS retail prices may have important implications
on the validity of price asymmetry results from previous work. The current study intends to
shed some light on this issue.
3 Methods
3.1 A Model of Beef Prices
Our baseline model is a threshold vector error correction (TVEC) model. Let Rt, Wt and Ft
be respectively the retail, wholesale, and farm prices of beef at time t. The structural form of
our TVEC model can be written as:
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c+24,k∆Ft−k + e2,t (2)
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c+34,k∆Ft−k + e3,t (3)
where ∆ is the difference operator; ECTt−1 = Rt−1 − γ0 − γ1Wt−1 − γ2Ft−1 is the one-period
lagged error correction term; the c+ij,k apply when the corresponding variable is positive and
the c−ij,k apply when the corresponding variable is negative or less than zero, for equation
i = 1, 2, 3, variable j = 2, 3, 4 and all k = 0, . . . , p, where p is the chosen lag length of the
VEC model.
e1,t, e2,t and e3,t are uncorrelated structural shocks to the retail, wholesale, and farm
beef markets, respectively. The structural TVEC model distinguishes between long-run and
short-run price adjustments. The long-run adjustment is determined by b+i1 and b−i1 and the




1 if ECTt−1 > τ
0 if ECTt−1 ≤ τ
(4)
where τ represents the threshold value estimated for the deviation from the long-run equi-
librium, which is selected by minimizing the sum of squared errors, with a minimum of 15
percent of the observations in each regime.
3.2 Threshold Cointegration Tests
We employ the Enders and Siklos (2001) test for threshold cointegration, which extends
Engle and Granger’s (1987) two-step estimation approach to include possibly asymmetric
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adjustment to equilibrium. The cointegration relationship between the three price series,
each assumed to be integrated of order one, takes the form:
Rt = γ0 + γ1Wt + γ2Ft + εt, (5)
where εt measures the deviation from the equilibrium relationship between Rt, Wt and Ft.
To allow for asymmetric adjustment dynamics, deviations from equilibrium are allowed to
follow a threshold autoregressive process:
εt = Iε,tρ1εt−1 + (1 − Iε,t) ρ2εt−1 +
P∑
k=1
δk∆εt−k + µt, (6)
where ρ1 and ρ2 are the speed of adjustment of ∆εt, and the indicator function Iε,t has a
similar specification as equation (4). Cointegration exists if ρ1 < 0 and/or ρ2 < 0, but as
the test statistic has a nonstandard distribution due to the data-determined selection of τ ,
we use the tMax and Φ tests. The tMax statistic is the largest t-statistic associated with the
estimated coefficients ρ1 and ρ2, and the Φ test is an F-test of the joint hypothesis ρ1 = ρ2 = 0.
Simulated critical values for both test statistics are provided by Enders and Siklos (2001).
3.3 Model Identification
The presence of time t variables as regressors in the system (1)-(3) means there is an
identification problem. One way to achieve identification would be to impose the assumption
that the system is recursive, for example, that c+22,0 = c−22,0 = c+32,0 = c−32,0 = c+33,0 = c−33,0 = 0.
Unfortunately, it is hard to justify such an assumption a priori, given the frequency of our
data and the information available to market participants.
To identify the system, we apply the heteroskedasticity-based estimator proposed in
Rigobon (2003) and subsequently applied to gasoline markets in Bachmeier (2013). If there
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are at least two regimes for the variances of the structural shocks, the system is identified
(Rigobon, 2003), and all parameters can be estimated by the generalized method of moments
(GMM). The question is how to divide the data into regimes of high and low structural shock
variances. We use historical volatilities corresponding to each price series to identify periods
of low and high volatility.8 Alternatively, we can rely on major market events such as the first
case of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), also known as mad cow disease, reported in
the U.S. in December 2003, to identify the regimes. The validity of the regime classification
can be formally tested given the estimated structural shock variances. Ultimately, this
identification approach delivers the estimates of contemporaneous coefficients c22,0, c32,0 and
c33,0 in system (1)-(3).
3.4 Symmetry Tests
After estimating the system (1)-(3), we test for symmetric responses to the structural shocks
in two ways. The first approach is to test for equality of the coefficients in the two regimes
using an F-test. A test for symmetric adjustment to deviations from the long run equilibrium
is a test of b+i1 = b−i1, while a test for symmetric short-run responses to price shocks is a
test of ∑pk=k0 c+ij,k = ∑pk=k0 c−ij,k, where k0 = 0 or 1, for each equation i = 1, 2, 3 and variable
j = 2, 3, 4. A rejection of either hypothesis indicates asymmetry in price adjustment. The
downside of testing for equality of coefficients is that a rejection of the null hypothesis of
linearity does not provide any information about the speed of adjustment or the direction of
asymmetry. The adjustment could be faster or slower after any particular shock. Further, it
is possible to reject the null hypothesis of equal slope coefficients, yet still have a symmetric
response to shocks at long horizons. That is, asymmetry in the coefficients at one horizon
can offset asymmetry in the coefficients at a different horizon. Due to this limitation of
coefficient tests, and to directly address the question of symmetry of responses to different
price shocks, our second test for symmetry is to calculate impulse response functions by
8Monthly historical volatility series are calculated using weekly prices.
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simulation following the approach outlined in Kilian and Vigfusson (2011).
The impulse response-based test is built on the observation that under the null
hypothesis of a symmetric response function, the vector of responses to a positive price shock
should be opposite in sign but of the same magnitude as the vector of responses to a negative
price shock of the same size. Hence, we can test that all elements of the sum of these two
vectors are zero. We compute impulse response functions by simulation using an algorithm
similar to that in Kilian and Vigfusson (2011). For example, the algorithm used to estimate
the response of the beef retail price to a farm price shock is:
1. Take a block of p consecutive values of ∆Rt, ∆Wt and ∆Ft, where p is the lag length
of the structural TVEC model. This defines a history Ωi.
2. Define e0 to be the shock to the price that is of interest (in this case the shock to ∆Ft).
3. Define e1,H and e2,H to be vectors holding a draw of H + 1 values of the identified
shocks to ∆R and ∆W , respectively, where H is the longest horizon for which impulse
response functions are calculated.
4. Define e3,H to be a vector holding a draw of H values of the identified shocks to ∆Ft.
5. Predict the values of ∆Rt+h, ∆Wt+h and ∆Ft+h for periods h = 0, . . . , H, conditional
on Ωi, e1H , e2H and (e0, e3H)′, where e0 is defined to be either a positive or negative
one standard deviation shock to ∆Ft.
6. Predict the values of ∆Rt+h, ∆Wt+h and ∆Ft+h for periods h = 0, . . . , H, conditional
on Ωi, e1H , e2H , and (e0, e3,H)′, where e0 = 0.
7. Calculate the difference in predicted values of the two variables from steps 5 and 6.
This difference is the impulse response of retail price to a farm price shock of size e0,
conditional on Ωi.
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8. Steps 1-7 are repeated 1,000 times. The unconditional impulse response function is the
average of the output from step 7 across the 1,000 simulations.
9. Perform a fixed-design wild bootstrap (Goncalves and Kilian, 2004) with 500 replications
to calculate confidence intervals.9 We use the Rademacher pick distribution as suggested
by Godfrey (2009).
4 Data
Our empirical analysis utilizes monthly beef prices observed from January 2001 through
December 2012 (144 observations), as well as weekly beef prices observed from January
2007 through December 2012 (312 observations). Monthly and weekly farm (live cattle)
and wholesale (boxed beef) price series were obtained from the Agricultural Marketing
Service (USDA-AMS). Farm price is the weighted-five-area average Texas-Oklahoma, Kansas,
Nebraska, Colorado, and Iowa-Minnesota live steer and heifer price for all grades. Wholesale
price is the weighted-average of Choice and Select boxed beef cutout value for 600-900 lbs.
carcasses. The Economic Research Service (USDA-ERS) has available monthly retail beef
prices reported by the BLS.10 The BLS retail price used is the traditional simple-average
retail price for all grades beef. All prices are in cents per pound.
To test whether the results are sensitive to the type of data used in the analysis of
asymmetric price transmissions, we also estimate our structural TVEC model (system (1)-(3))
using scanner quantity-weighted retail prices. Scanner data are compiled by USDA-ERS and
Freshlook and were obtained from the National Cattlemen’s Beef Association. These prices
are in both monthly and weekly frequency and also correspond to all grades of beef.11 In total,
9The wild bootstrap accounts for possible conditional heteroskedasticity of the error term.
10The BLS retail price for beef is only available on a monthly frequency.
11The scanner price data is only available beginning in January 2001 (monthly data) and January 2007
(weekly data), and was consistently collected until December 2012, thus limiting the period considered in this
analysis.
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three (trivariate) structural TVEC models are estimated using: monthly BLS, wholesale and
farm prices; monthly scanner, wholesale and farm prices; and weekly scanner, wholesale and
farm prices.
Figure 1 contains the plot of monthly BLS and scanner beef retail price series. There
are apparent differences between the two price series. The mean of scanner prices for all
grades of beef is 352.9 cents/lb. and the mean of BLS prices for all grades of beef is 375.2
cents/lb. According to the difference in means test, BLS prices are on average 6% higher
than scanner prices (p-value < 0.01). In addition, a test of equality of variances indicates
that the variance of detrended scanner prices (20.5) is larger than the variance of detrended
BLS prices (14.4) (p-value < 0.01).
Unit root tests did not reject nonstationarity of any of the price series.12 In addition,
we conducted the Enders and Siklos’s (2001) tMax and Φ tests for threshold cointegration on
each structural TVEC model to account for possible asymmetric adjustments to deviations
from the long-run equilibrium (Table 1). This test was performed in two steps. First,
equation (5) was estimated by OLS for each model. Then, equation (6) was estimated using
the residuals from equation (5) and the specification of equation (4) where the value of τ was
set equal to zero (TC1) and different from zero (TC2), in which case the threshold value
was estimated by grid search method as described in Chan (1993). Looking at the results in
Table 1, we reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration at the 0.05 significance level in all
cases, whether or not the threshold value is assumed to be zero. We conclude that there is a
long-run equilibrium relationship characterized by asymmetric adjustment, and proceed with
a structural TVEC model.
12We used an ADF test with lag length chosen by the AIC.
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5 Results and Discussion
5.1 Baseline Model
Our baseline model is estimated using the natural logarithms of monthly retail BLS, wholesale
and farm prices in first differences (Monthly BLS). We then check the sensitivity of these
results by estimating two additional structural TVEC models, one using monthly scanner,
wholesale and farm prices (Monthly Scanner), and the other using weekly scanner, wholesale
and farm prices (Weekly Scanner). The data in both models are also expressed in natural
logarithms and first differences.
The estimation of structural TVEC models using monthly data requires the iden-
tification of contemporaneous effects.13 We used the method proposed by Rigobon (2003),
which exploits the heteroskedasticity of structural shocks. Two regimes, one of high volatility
and one of low volatility, were identified using historical volatilities derived from each price
series. First, a structural break test was conducted in the historical volatility series to find
significant breaks and define the regime windows more precisely. We applied the Bai and
Perron (2003) test because it allows us to identify multiple breaks. We allowed up to 5 breaks
and used a trimming of at least 0.15, so each segment has a minimum of 15 observations.
The best number of breaks was selected based on the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC).
Results from this test indicate the presence of one high volatility regime from February
2003 to June 2004, most likely caused by the BSE discovery. Thus, we define this period
as the high volatility regime, and the remaining as the low volatility regime. Coefficients
of contemporaneous effects and variances of structural shocks were estimated by GMM,
with standard errors and confidence intervals computed using a fixed-design wild bootstrap
(Goncalves and Kilian, 2004).
We reject the null hypothesis that the system estimated using monthly data is
13Causality from farm to wholesale and retail markets using weekly data has been discussed in previous
research (Goodwin and Holt, 1999).
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recursive with a causal direction from farm to wholesale to retail prices, as previously
assumed in models estimated using weekly data.14 Wholesale and farm prices affect retail
prices contemporaneously, but not vice versa. Therefore, we set c+22,0 = c−22,0 = 0 and
c+32,0 = c−32,0 = 0. We also find that farm and wholesale prices affect each other at time
t. Because this is a bi-directional effect, the system cannot be estimated without further
assumptions. Therefore, we assume that the contemporaneous effects of farm and wholesale
prices on each other are symmetric by imposing the estimated values delivered by GMM, so
that c+24,0 = c−24,0 = 0.30 and c+33,0 = c−33,0 = 0.76
The final step in the model specification stage is to impose thresholds. For the
short run responses, we set the threshold to zero, so that price increases and decreases have
different effects. For the long-run responses, we used two different specifications of equation
(4), one where τ = 0 and one where τ was estimated by grid search. Based on the Akaike
information criterion (AIC), models estimated with a non-zero τ are preferred over models
estimated with a value of τ equal to zero. Therefore, we based our analysis on models where
the threshold value in equation (4) is different from zero. Furthermore, based on AIC and
the evaluation of autocorrelation patterns, the models Monthly BLS and Monthly Scanner
were estimated using four lags, and the model Weekly Scanner was estimated using six lags.
Table 2 presents parameter estimates of the equation for retail beef price series, given
by (1), for both Monthly BLS and Monthly Scanner models.15 T-values were calculated using
Newey and West’s (1987) HAC consistent standard errors when serial correlation was present
in model residuals (i.e., Monthly Scanner model), and the cointegrating vector parameters
were estimated using the Engle and Granger (1987) method to maintain consistency with the
Enders and Siklos test.
The coefficients on the error correction term (ECT ), which measure the immediate
adjustment to the deviation from equilibrium, are negative and statistically significant in both
14GMM and wild bootstrap estimates are available upon request.
15Results from farm and wholesale models (equations 2 and 3), and those estimated using weekly data, are
not presented but are available upon request.
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equations. The coefficients on ECT indicate what portion of the disequilibrium is corrected
from one period to the next. The adjustment to disequilibrium is several times larger in the
Monthly Scanner model than in the Monthly BLS model. For example, b+11, which captures
the response of retail price in the high deviation regime, is -0.162 for Monthly BLS and -0.558
for Monthly Scanner. This indicates that the immediate adjustment of scanner retail prices is
almost 3.5 times faster than BLS retail prices after a given shock. In other words, retail beef
scanner prices are much more responsive to deviations from equilibrium than are BLS retail
prices. This is consistent with the notion that scanner prices are more reflective of the prices
actually being paid at retail. Any further interpretation of the relationships at alternative
market levels is best done by calculating impulse response functions rather than examining
individual coefficient estimates.
5.2 Slope-Based Test of Symmetry
Table 3 presents the results from the slope-based test of symmetry applied to the parameter
estimates of each equation in structural TVEC models estimated using the two types of
data at different frequencies. The first column identifies the type of data used, followed
below by the equation that is being tested. The second and third columns present results
from the tests conducted on the short-run and long-run adjustments, respectively. There is
evidence of long-run asymmetric price adjustment for only the Monthly Scanner retail price
equation. These results indicate that beef prices along the vertical market chain adjust equally
to positive and negative changes away from the long-run equilibrium, with one exception.
Regarding the short-run price adjustment, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of symmetry
at the 0.05 significance level in the Monthly Scanner retail price equation. As noted above,
while this test finds evidence of nonlinearity in one of the estimated equations, it does not
provide information about the source of asymmetry (e.g., whether asymmetry is due to the
farm or wholesale price adjustments, to its own shocks, or to more than one shock), the
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form that the asymmetry takes, or the speed of adjustment following positive and negative
shocks to one of the variables in the model. The nonlinear impulse response function analysis
proposed by Kilian and Vigfusson (2011) is able to provide a more meaningful summary of
the estimated models.
5.3 Impulse Response-Based Test of Symmetry
Results from the impulse response-based test of symmetry are plotted in Figures 2-4. Each
row in these Figures corresponds to responses of shocks to farm, wholesale and retail prices,
respectively, expressed in percentage changes since variables in each TVEC model are in
log-differences. Figure 2 depicts cumulative impulse responses to a one-standard deviation
positive and negative shock in farm, wholesale, and retail (BLS and scanner) prices.16 For
example, the size of the initial farm price shock is 2.4% in the model estimated using BLS
retail price data (first row).
The implied responses in Figure 2 to shocks of typical magnitude are very symmetric
in some cases, while present some degree of asymmetry in others. However, responses
estimated using scanner data seem to be more symmetric than those estimated using BLS
data. From this figure, we can obtain information related to the speed of adjustment in
price transmissions. The plots indicate that price responses adjust as fast following positive
or negative shocks, providing evidence that the speed of adjustment in price transmissions
is fairly symmetric regardless of the type of data used. However, it takes longer for the
system to adjust to farm and wholesale price shocks, compared to shocks on retail prices.
For example, it can take up to 10 months for wholesale and retail prices to adjust to farm
price shocks, whereas responses to retail market shocks are generally complete after 7 months,
suggesting that farm and wholesale price shocks have a longer effect in the beef supply chain.
Figure 2 also provide information regarding the responsiveness of scanner and BLS
16Note that cumulative responses to negative shocks are shown as a mirror image to facilitate comparison.
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retail beef prices to changes in upstream prices. This figure shows that monthly retail scanner
prices are more responsive to farm and wholesale prices changes than monthly retail BLS
prices. For example, after a 2.7% shock to wholesale prices, the maximum reaction in BLS
retail prices is 1.3% increase or decrease depending on the sign of the shock. However, scanner
retail prices have a reaction of as large as 2% increase or decrease after the same shock
(second row). This result provides more evidence in favor of scanner prices because it shows
that they are more reflective of reality.
In Figures 3-4, the solid line is the summation of positive and negative IRF. The
null hypothesis of symmetry is rejected if corresponding confidence intervals do not contain
0. Therefore, our impulse response based test is based on the statistical significance of the
solid line depicted in each plot. Confidence intervals are computed using the fixed-design
wild bootstrap estimates, and are represented by the dashed lines.
Figures 3-4 provide information regarding the magnitude of price adjustments derived
from models estimated using BLS and Scanner retail price data, respectively. Comparing
price responses following a shock to farm price in, we reject the null hypothesis of symmetry
at the 0.05 significance level in one case. This case shows a negative asymmetric response
in BLS retail prices during the first and second month after the shock (Figure 3, first row).
That is, after a 2.40% positive shock to farm price, retail prices increase 0.22% percent. In
contrast, after a 2.40% negative shock, retail prices fall by 0.38% percent, two months after
the shock. Economically, this magnitude of asymmetry of 0.16% is small compared to the
size of the farm shock. This result is not robust to other type or frequency of data. That
is, both structural TVEC models estimated using monthly and weekly scanner data fail to
reject the null hypothesis of symmetry (Figure 4, first row).17
Focusing on price responses following a shock to wholesale price, farm, wholesale
and retail prices show a statistically significant and positive asymmetric response to this
17Plots derived from models estimated using weekly scanner data are not presented but are available upon
request.
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shock (Figure 3, second row). Following a 2.70% increase in wholesale price, wholesale prices
increase by 3.50%, but decrease by 2.56% three months after a negative shock of the same
magnitude. Similarly, farm prices increase 2.95% when the wholesale shock is positive, but
decrease 1.95% when the wholesale shock is negative, three months after the shock. Contrary
to previous research, this finding suggests that prices received by beef cattle producers adjust
more fully to wholesale price increases than decreases. Moreover, four months after the
wholesale shock, retail beef prices increase 1.3%, but decrease 0.88%. This indicates that
price increases at the retail level, caused by increases in wholesale prices, are transmitted
more fully to consumers than price decreases. It also signals a relative advantage of retailers
over meat packers and processors, because their gross margin tends to remain the same
after a wholesale price increase, whereas it expands after a wholesale price decrease. On the
contrary, results derived from scanner prices show symmetric responses following a shock
to the wholesale price (Figure 4, second row). The same applies to responses derived from
weekly data.
Following shocks to the retail price (Figure 3, third row), we fail to reject the null
hypothesis of symmetry in all cases, except one. BLS retail prices react asymmetrically to
own price shocks. That is, following a 0.9% positive and negative own-price shock, the BLS
retail price increases 0.65% and decreases 0.52%, respectively. This result, however, is not
robust to either type or frequency of data (Figure 4, third row). Altogether these results show
evidence of how different types of data can lead to different conclusions about asymmetric
price transmissions.
Table 4 summarizes the results from the impulse response-based test of symmetry
in structural TVEC models. Interestingly, asymmetric responses along the beef market chain
are only found in models that use BLS retail price data.18 In particular, retail prices respond
asymmetrically to shocks in farm and wholesale prices, as well as own-price shocks. In
18These results are robust to using a recursive identification scheme, where the direction of causality flows
from farm to wholesale and retail markets.
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addition, results obtained from models that use scanner retail price data are robust to the use
of different data frequency (i.e., monthly and weekly). However, they are not consistent with
results found using the slope-based test of symmetry (table 3). This finding corroborates
Kilian and Vigfusson’s (2011) argument suggesting that slope-based tests are misleading when
the quantity of interest is the degree to which impulse response functions are asymmetric.
Since our findings differ from those found in the existing literature, an important
question is whether it is because of the use of different methodologies, newer data, or a
different type of data (scanner prices). To address this question, we applied our weekly model
to the data set used by GH. GH found statistically significant, positive asymmetry in the
wholesale market after a shock in farm prices using data from 1981 to 1998.19 However, the
magnitude of this asymmetry was economically small. Results of applying our model to
their data reveal asymmetric price transmissions, consistent with their findings. Particularly,
wholesale prices responded asymmetrically to shocks in farm prices in all horizons (up to 18
weeks after the shock).20 However, the asymmetric responses we found were not as modest.
Following a 2% positive and negative shocks to farm price, the net result is an average
increase of 0.56% in wholesale prices. This assessment suggests that our results do not differ
from GH because of methodology differences. Instead our differences in results rest on the
use of more recent and/or different data. It is possible that the passage of the LMPR Act
has improved the efficiency of beef markets in the U.S. However, a more detailed assessment
would be needed to support such a claim. A more plausible explanation is that the scanner
price data better reflect the prices consumers actually pay for beef.
19Although GH did not use BLS data in their study, they found asymmetric price transmissions using
weekly average retail prices collected by a private news service that were collected in a similar fashion to how
the BLS data are collected (i.e., they were simple averages of listed prices, not volume-weighted prices).
20The null hypothesis of symmetry was rejected at the 0.1 significance level.
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5.4 Counterfactual Analysis
One objection to our failure to reject symmetry with the impulse response function-based
tests is that those tests might have low power.21 We have evaluated the relevance of this
concern via a series of counterfactual exercises. Because our analysis reveals that scanner
prices are likely to be more reflective of purchases at the retail level, we focus on the models
with scanner price data. The first counterfactual asks how the retail beef price would have
behaved over our sample period if the retail price had responded symmetrically to all shocks.
Specifically, we modified the estimated equation (1) to be symmetric:










We did this by transforming (1) in two ways:
• Case 1: Impose b11 = b̂+11, c12,k = ĉ+12,k, c13,k = ĉ+13,k, and c14,k = ĉ+14.
• Case 2: Impose b11 = b̂−11, c12,k = ĉ−12,k, c13,k = ĉ−13,k, and c14,k = ĉ−14.
The simulation was performed using the identified structural shocks together with the initial
values of the retail, wholesale, and farm beef prices at the beginning of our sample. If price
asymmetry hurts consumers, the simulated retail price series (which imposes symmetric
responses) will be below the historical retail price series. The two price series can be seen in
Figure 5. Although there are some differences in the two simulated price series, the general
pattern is the same - the retail beef price would have been higher under symmetry. This
indicates that to the extent that our tests are unable to detect asymmetry, any asymmetry
that does exist has benefited consumers.
We repeated the exercise to see if farmers might be hurt by asymmetry. We imposed
21We are not aware of any evidence to support that assertion, but test power is always a concern when one
fails to reject the null hypothesis.
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symmetry on equation (3), which has been identified by imposing c33,0 = 0.76:










and symmetry is imposed as:
• Case 1: b31 = b̂+31, c32,k = ĉ+32,k, c33,k = ĉ+33,k, and c34,k = ĉ+34.
• Case 2: b31 = b̂−31, c32,k = ĉ−32,k, c33,k = ĉ−33,k, and c34,k = ĉ−34.
Similar to the retail case, the simulation was performed using the identified structural shocks
together with the initial values of the retail, wholesale, and farm beef prices at the beginning
of our sample. If price asymmetry hurts farmers, the simulated farm price series (which
imposes symmetric responses) will be above the historical farm price series. Both simulated
and actual price series can be seen in Figure 6. Here, we observe two different outcomes -
the farm beef price would have been lower under case 1, which benefits farmers, and higher
under case 2, which harms farmers. It is possible (based on the case 2 results) that there is a
harmful form of asymmetry that the impulse-response based test is simply not able to detect.
To understand whether the observed nonlinearities in the wholesale price adjustment
influence the behavior of farm prices, we treated the coefficients involving ∆W separately,
resulting in four cases:
• Case 3: c33,k = ĉ+33,k.
• Case 4: c33,k = ĉ−33,k.
• Case 5: b31 = b̂+31, c32,k = ĉ+32,k, and c34,k = ĉ+34.
• Case 6: b31 = b̂−31, c32,k = ĉ−32,k, and c34,k = ĉ−34.
Figure 7 shows that the simulated farm price under symmetry is below the historical farm
price when the wholesale price change coefficients are restricted to be symmetric (cases 3 and
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4). However, when only the responses to retail and farm shocks are restricted to be symmetric,
the simulated farm price is above the historical farm price (cases 5 and 6). Because this
counterfactual analysis allows us to disentangle the total effect of each shock, we are able to
confirm that positive asymmetry in the farm market is most likely caused by a nonlinear price
adjustment at the wholesale market level. The impulse response-based test failed to show
this result most likely because it accounts for the total effect when testing for asymmetry,
and does not consider cases 1 and 2 separately, which appear to offset each other.
6 Conclusions
Price transmissions among farm, wholesale and retail U.S. beef markets have been a hotly
debated topic for a long time. A sizable body of past research has found asymmetric
price responses from upstream to downstream markets. A host of potential explanations
including market power, information flows, inventory adjustments, menu costs, and empirical
methodology employed have been suggested in the literature. We provide new results
that update previous studies using more appropriate scanner data to the retail price series
evaluated, and employ a new methodology that is designed to allow for the analysis of price
asymmetry. Using this novel approach based on the simulation of nonlinear impulse response
functions, we test for asymmetric price transmissions in the U.S. beef supply chain.
In general, farm, wholesale, and retail beef prices respond symmetrically to price
changes at each market level in models estimated using scanner retail price data at either
monthly or weekly frequency. This result reveals an efficient market where price signals
transmit vertically in a symmetric fashion up and down the beef value chain. This indicates
that farm prices generally respond similarly to downstream market price increases and
decreases, and consumer beef prices respond similarly symmetric to upstream price changes.
However, we find evidence of asymmetry when models are estimated using BLS retail price
series. By the way BLS retail price data are collected, they do not accurately reflect volume-
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weighted sales of beef products. Instead, BLS price data simply reflect posted shelf prices on
beef products with limited adjustment for actual volumes of beef that is sold at each price
level. In contrast, scanner data reflect volume-weighted prices paid for beef sold across retail
UPC scanners. As such, scanner data reflect what consumers actually paid for retail beef
products including feature prices which generate larger volume of store sales. Consistent with
this is that scanner data beef prices are much more responsive than BLS prices to wholesale
beef price changes. The implication is that farm-to-retail margins or the farmer’s share of the
retail beef dollar calculated using standard BLS retail beef prices are biased and unreliable
barometers of farm-to-retail price relationships. This weakness strongly suggests that the use
of scanner data for such comparisons would be more reflective of prices actually being paid
at retail.
When we disentangle the total effect of a shock to each price series using counter-
factual exercises, we find that farm prices tend to respond asymmetrically to wholesale price
changes. Interestingly, the type of asymmetry found is positive, indicating that feedlot owners
benefit from price changes at the wholesale level. However, this effect is negligible, or cannot
be captured by our impulse response-based test, because it is offset by farm price responses
at retail and farm levels. Our preferred interpretation is simpler, with the relationship being
symmetric, consistent with the hypothesis tests. The counterfactual analysis also suggests
that the source of positive asymmetry at the farm level is caused by nonlinearities in the price
adjustment of wholesale prices. Beef packers have flexibility to store beef in their coolers
when short run wholesale prices decline and as such they can buffer wholesale beef price
changes through adjustments to beef inventories. This could make price transmission appear
asymmetric, similarly to the notion of captive supplies discussed in Schroeter and Azzam,
2003. The inventory flexibility beef packers have is a probable explanation of the asymmetry
observed in wholesale beef price responses to own price shocks.
Our results showing symmetric price responses in the U.S. beef market contrast with
those obtained when applying our methodology to a period prior the passage of the LMPR Act.
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Thus suggesting that asymmetry findings do not depend on the methods employed. Perhaps
the increased intensity of price reporting under the Act contributed to enhanced vertical
market price transmission. However, a more profound assessment is needed to establish the
level of causality of the Act on price transmissions, so this remains a question for future
research.
The implication of our findings is that concerns voiced over the years about price
asymmetry in the U.S. beef market and associated hypotheses regarding potential causes of
previously found asymmetry appear less acute when the retail price data used in the empirical
analysis is more reflective of actual consumer purchases.
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Figure 1. Monthly Retail BLS and Scanner Beef Prices, January 2001- December 2012


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 7.  Farm Price Counterfactual Analysis 
   
Table 1. Results from the EndersSiklos (2001) Test for Threshold Cointegration (TC)
Relationship Cointegration Test-Statistics
tMax C.V. Φ C.V. threshold
TC 1
BLS-Wholesale-Farm -3.62** -2.14 14.57** 6.01 0
Scanner-Wholesale-Farma -4.11** -1.98 13.33** 6.28 0
Scanner-Wholesale-Farmb -3.19** -1.91 9.83** 6.35 0
TC 2
BLS-Wholesale-Farm -3.89** -1.90 14.96** 7.08 3.85
Scanner-Wholesale-Farma -4.24** -1.92 13.67** 7.41 -6.19
Scanner-Wholesale-Farmb -3.10** -1.73 10.50** 7.56 4.05
Notes: The null hypothesis under test is no cointegration. Approximate critical values for the
tMax and Φ tests are tabulated by Enders and Siklos (2001). The critical values (C.V.) reported
correspond to the 0.05 signicance level. ** indicates the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 0.05
signicance level. (a) refers to monthly data, and (b) refers to weekly data.
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Table 2. Estimation Results from Structural TVEC Models using Monthly Data (Retail Equation)
Monthly BLS Monthly Scanner
Regressor Coecient T-Value Coecient T-Value
Constant 0.559** 2.036 2.332*** 3.256
ECT+t−1 -0.162*** -3.461 -0.558*** -5.590
ECT−t−1 -0.114*** -3.008 -0.860*** -10.261
4PB+t−1 0.005 0.036 - -
4PB−t−1 -0.612*** -3.450 - -
4PB+t−2 -0.016 -0.117 - -
4PB−t−2 -0.072 -0.380 - -
4PB+t−3 -0.081 -0.631 - -
4PB−t−3 0.266 1.456 - -
4PB+t−4 0.035 0.270 - -
4PB−t−4 -0.020 -0.115 - -
4PS+t−1 - - -0.239** -2.064
4PS−t−1 - - 0.202* 1.697
4PS+t−2 - - -0.037 -0.516
4PS−t−2 - - 0.228 1.300
4PS+t−3 - - -0.178* -1.920
4PS−t−3 - - 0.339*** 2.626
4PS+t−4 - - 0.145 1.222
4PS−t−4 - - -0.210* -1.700
4PW+t 0.036 0.512 0.367* 1.908
4PW−t -0.091 -1.010 0.051 0.194
4PW+t−1 0.069 0.968 -0.340 -1.165
4PW−t−1 0.014 0.148 -0.211 -0.869
4PW+t−2 0.048 0.656 0.071 0.297
4PW−t−2 -0.120 -1.268 -0.572** -2.153
4PW+t−3 0.060 0.841 -0.356* -1.672
4PW−t−3 -0.092 -1.022 0.303 1.210
4PW+t−4 -0.139*** -1.988 0.224 1.504
4PW−t−4 -0.108 -1.239 0.213 1.183
4PF+t -0.012 -0.176 -0.489*** -3.014
4PF−t 0.241*** 3.016 -0.110 -0.538
4PF+t−1 -0.064 -0.933 0.144 0.730
4PF−t−1 0.076 0.908 0.047 0.232
4PF+t−2 0.117* 1.698 -0.134 -0.455
4PF−t−2 0.141* 1.699 0.347 1.440
4PF+t−3 -0.049 -0.730 0.270 1.568
4PF−t−3 0.086 1.082 0.069 0.374
4PF+t−4 0.049 0.722 -0.380*** -2.639
4PF−t−4 0.169** 2.083 -0.331** -2.156





Notes: ***, ** and * indicate statistical signicance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively. The
lag length was determined using the AIC.
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Table 3. Results from the Slope-Based Test of Symmetry in Structural TVEC Models















BLS 0.776 [0.380] 0.157 [0.693]
Wholesale 0.001 [0.992] 1.240 [0.268]
Farm 0.433 [0.512] 0.755 [0.387]
Monthly Scanner
Scanner 12.754 [0.000] 7.918 [0.005]
Wholesale 0.979 [0.325] 0.450 [0.504]
Farm 0.074 [0.787] 0.006 [0.938]
Weekly Scanner
Scanner 0.408 [0.523] 2.102 [0.148]
Wholesale 0.111 [0.739] 0.198 [0.656]
Farm 0.001 [0.983] 0.182 [0.669]
Notes: H0 describes the respective null hypotheses under test. For the short-run adjustment, the
null hypothesis corresponds to equation i = 1, 2, 3, variable j = 2, 3, 4, and all k = 1, ..., p, where p
is the number of lags in the estimated structural TVEC model. Corresponding p-values for F tests
are given in brackets.
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Table 4. Descriptive Results from the Impulse Response Based Test of Symmetry in Structural
TVEC Models
TVEC Model Asymmetric Price Response
Shock to Farm Farm Wholesale Retail
Monthly BLS none none negative
Monthly Scanner none none none
Weekly Scanner none none none
Shock to Wholesale Farm Wholesale Retail
Monthly BLS positive positive positive
Monthly Scanner none none none
Weekly Scanner none none none
Shock to Retail Farm Wholesale Retail
Monthly BLS none none positive
Monthly Scanner none none none
Weekly Scanner none none none
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